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Abstract. The aim of this essay is to put forward a performative, socio-
material perspective on Information Systems (IS) success and failure in or-
ganisations by focusing intently upon the discursive-material nature of IS de-
velopment and use in practice. Through the application of Actor Network 
Theory (ANT) to the case of an IS that transacts insurance products we 
demonstrate the contribution of such a perspective to the understanding of 
how IS success and failure occur in practice.  The manuscript puts our argu-
ment forward by first critiquing the existing perspectives on IS success and 
failure in the literature for their inadequate consideration of the materiality of 
IS, of its underling technologies and of the entanglement of the social and 
material aspects of IS development and use. From a sociomaterial perspective 
IS are not seen as objects that impact organisations one way or another, but 
instead as relational effects continually enacted in practice. As enactments in 
practice IS development and use produce realities of IS success and failure.  
Keywords: IS success, IS failure, IS development, IS assessment, socio-
materiality, actor-network-theory (ANT). 
1 Introduction 
IS success and failure has been a prominent research topic since the very inception of 
the field.  The whole Information Technology (IT) industry, as Fincham (2002) notes, 
loudly trumpets its successes and failures and in particular “seems perversely capti-
                                                          
1The argument presented in this keynote essay has subsequently been further developed in 
Cecez-Kecmanovic, D., Kautz, K. and Abrahall, R. “Reframing Success and Failure of Infor-
mation Systems: A Performative Perspective”, to appear in MIS Quarterly, 2013. 
 
vated by its own failures” (p. 1).  Some examples of high-profile IS project failures 
include the disastrous development of ‘Socrate’ by the French Railways (Mitev 
1996), the dramatic failure of Taurus at the London Stock Exchange (Currie 1997), 
the failed patient administration system at NSW Health in Australia (Sauer et al. 
1997), and the Internal Revenue Service’s development of a new US Tax Modernisa-
tion System (Nelson and Ravichandran 2001). High failure rates of IS projects and 
our inability to understand and explain, let alone prevent, the failures suggest that 
perhaps existing assumptions and approaches to IS research have not served us too 
well.   
In 2001, the Australian subsidiary of a large multinational insurance company 
dealing primarily in business and life insurance, which we call Olympia, undertook to 
become the first insurance provider in Australia of web-based e-business services to 
their brokers. In 2006, the web-based information system (IS), named ‘Olympia-
online’ emerged as a sophisticated IS, eagerly adopted and highly praised by brokers. 
Olympia-online’s success in the broker community created a competitive advantage 
for the company leading to an increase in their profit margins. However, being over 
time and over budget, and not delivering expected internal functionality the system 
was perceived as a big failure by the top business managers.  That Olympia-online 
was considered simultaneously as a success and a failure, with both views firmly 
supported by evidence, is extraordinary and challenges the established understandings 
of IS success and failure.  From a rationalist perspective IS success or failure are de-
fined as discrete, objectively measured and definite states and outcomes contingent 
upon simple causation, e.g. certain technical characteristics and social factors or caus-
ally linked variables (DeLone and McLean, 1992). The socio-technical and process 
oriented perspective assumes that there is no “objectively correct account of failure” 
(Sauer, 1993, p. 24) or success, but it too assumes an objectified view resulting from 
politically and socially determined flaws and processes. Neither the rationalist nor the 
socio-technical process approach can explain the persisting co-existence of Olympia-
online success and failure. From a social constructivist perspective (Fincham 2002), 
these co-existing perceptions can be explained by conflicting subjective interpreta-
tions and discourses of relevant social groups (Bijker 1993; Bartis and Mitev 2007). 
Assuming ‘interpretive flexibility’ of IS, this perspective helps understand how dif-
ferent social groups attribute different meanings and construct different assessments 
of an existing IS.  This perspective has been critiqued for black-boxing IS and for 
putting too much emphasis on the interpretation and signification of IS while over-
looking the ways in which IS’ materiality is always already implicated in its social 
constructions (Orlikowski 2007).  
In response we propose a sociomaterial perspective of IS success and failure in-
formed by the works of Orlikowski and Scott (2008), Latour (2005), and Law (1992, 
2004) among others.  While social construction focuses on performativity of language 
and discourses, the sociomaterial perspective focuses on IS enactment in practice that 
implies performativity of both discourses and technologies. We suggest that an IS 
assessment is not only an interpretation or social construction, but a result of IS en-
actments in practice that produce realities (Law 2004). If an IS can be differently 
enacted in different practices we should expect a possibility that such enactments can 
produce different realities.  It is this reality making capacity of IS enactment in differ-
ent practices that we propose to understand the co-existing realities of IS success and 
failure.  When different IS enactments create multiple realities, contradicting realities 
of IS assessments may emerge and coexist. To substantiate our claim we draw from 
sociology of science and technology studies and specifically actor-network theory 
(ANT) (Callon 1986; Latour 2005; Law 1992, 2004) as one prominent way of dealing 
with sociomateriality of IS (Orlikowski 2007). An ANT account of the Olympia-
online grounds and illustrates the sociomaterial perspective on IS success and failure.  
We first review different approaches to IS success and failure, then we introduce 
the key assumptions of the sociomaterial perspective. This is followed by a descrip-
tion of ANT in the research methodology section which leads to the ANT account of 
the Olympia-online development and use. The ensuing discussion focuses on the 
ways Olympia-online was enacted in the practices of the brokers, the developers, and  
the business managers, and how these different enactments created multiple, only 
partially overlapping realities. Finally we summarize the contributions of the socio-
material perspective to understand the entangled, discursive-material production of IS 
success and failure.   
2 Literature Review and Theoretical Background 
We base our literature review on Fincham (2002) who distinguishes three perspec-
tives on IS success and failure. The rationalist view explains success and failure as 
brought about by factors which primarily represent managerial and organizational 
features in system development and which are related through simple causation.  De-
Lone and McLean’s (1992) model of success and Lyttinen and Hirschheim’s (1987) 
classification of the IS failure concept are well-known examples of this perspective. 
Numerous other studies found that social/organisational factors, rather than technical, 
had been dominant contributors to failure (e.g. Luna-Reyes et al. 2005; Lee and Xia 
2005). Luna-Reyes et al. (2005) claim that as much as 90% of IS failures are attribut-
ed to these factors.  Underlying the rationalist view is an assumption that IS success 
and failure are discrete states that can be identified and predicted by the pres-
ence/absence of certain factors. Although the lists of factors do not provide coherent 
explanations of why and how success and failure occur and rarely explain the phe-
nomenon across different organizations, this is still the dominant view in the literature 
(DeLone and McLean 2003). 
The process perspective addresses these shortcomings. It emphasizes organiza-
tional and social-political processes and explains success and failure as the result of a 
socio-technical interaction of different stakeholders with IS. Kautz and McMaster 
(1994) provide one example for this view; but Sauer’s (1993) model of IS failure is 
the most comprehensive framework utilizing this perspective. Although it focuses on 
organizational and socio-technical processes, these are still seen to cause fail-
ure/success as discrete outcomes (Fincham 2002). The perspective remains anchored 
to some rational assumptions such as failure having a clear-cut impact and being ob-
jectivised as irreversible. Thus it does not cater for ambiguity in socio-political pro-
cesses nor does it allow reflections on the relationship between success and failure, 
such as why success and failure are simultaneously attributed to the same IT artefact 
or how and why success is so often created out of failure. 
Alternatively, Fincham (2002) puts forward a social constructivist, narrative per-
spective where the organizational and socio-political processes and the actions and 
stories accompanying it, are based on sense-making and interpretation and where IS 
success and failure are explained as a social construction. The social constructivist 
perspective draws attention to different viewpoints and interpretations of IS by rele-
vant social groups thus resulting in interpretive flexibility of IT artefacts (Bijker, 
1993; Wilson and Howcroft 2005). Extending the social constructivist perspective 
with organizational power and culture, Bartis and Mitev (2008) explain how the dom-
inant narrative of a more powerful relevant social group prevailed and disguised an IS 
failure as success.  Mitev (2005) also proposes extending the social constructivist 
perspective by using ANT. Like McMaster et al. (1997) and McMaster and Wastell 
(2004), she utilizes ANT with its concepts of human and non-human actants interre-
lated in actor-networks going  beyond simple explanations of technological determin-
ism to explain success and failure. However, these accounts neglect a view of IT arte-
facts as more than social constructions, but less than reified physical entities (Quat-
trone and Hopper 2006).   
This view emphasises the sociomaterial nature of an IT artefact: its agency resides 
neither in a technology nor in a human actor, but in a chain of relations between hu-
man and technological actants. With its rich theoretical background it inspired us to 
propose a fourth, sociomaterial perspective on IS success and failure which goes be-
yond social construction and the representational perspective where IS success and 
failure are represented either by objective measures or by subjective perceptions of 
social actors assuming that representations and the objects they represent are inde-
pendently existing entities. The sociomaterial perspective assumes inherently insepa-
rable sociality and materiality of IS (Orlikowski 2007; Orlikowski and Scott 2008). It 
introduces a way of seeing an IS development and use and its assessment not only 
discursively constructed but also materially produced and enacted in practice. Exem-
plified by ANT the sociomaterial perspective assumes a relational ontology involving 
human and non-human actors that take their form and acquire their attributes as a 
result of their mutual relations in actor-networks. Its relationality “means that major 
ontological categories (for instance, ‘technology’ and ‘society’, ‘human’ and ‘non-
human’) are treated as effects or outcomes, rather than as explanatory resources” 
(Law, 2004, p. 157); IS development and use can thus be seen as relational effects 
performed within actor-networks. We focus on the performed relations and the phe-
nomena of IS development, use and assessment as the primary units of analysis and 
not on a given object or entity. In following Barad (2003) we understand phenomena 
as ontologically primitive relations without pre-existing relata which exist only within 
phenomena; they are ontologically inseparable of agentially intra-acting components. 
The notion of intra-action constitutes an alteration of the traditional notion of causali-
ty. Intra-actions within a phenomenon enact local agential separability and agential 
cuts which effect and allow for local separation within a phenomenon. Hence, within 
inseparable phenomena agential separation is possible. Performativity then is under-
stood as the iterative intra-activity within a phenomenon (Barad 2003). This perspec-
tive allows us to identify and to better understand IS-related phenomena by investigat-
ing them in their inseparability as well as in their local separability, intra-action and 
agency through agential cuts, both in the context of utilization and the development of 
IS. Table 1 summarizes the four perspectives on IS success and failure.  
  Table 1: IS  success and failure Perspectives (extended from Fincham 2002) 
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 The sociomaterial perspective helps us turn the epistemological question – how 
can we find out and predict whether an IS is ‘true’ success or failure? – into ontologi-
cal ones: How does IS success or failure come about?  How is an IS enacted in prac-
tice? How do these enactments produce different realities, including the coexisting 
assessments of IS success and failure? To answer these questions we do not take the 
social factors or processes or technology as given.  Instead we investigate the actors 
and actants as they enrol and perform in heterogeneous actor-networks; we follow the 
emergence and reconfiguration of actor-networks and the ways IS enactments in prac-
tice are negotiated and realities are created.  Within the sociomaterial perspective IS 
are seen as sociotechnical relational actants or actor-networks that come into being 
through enactment in practice. This enactment involves mutually intertwined discur-
sive and material production.  Different perceptions and interpretive flexibility of an 
IS, as advocated by social constructivists, reveal only one side of a coin – the discur-
sive production of IS. The sociomaterial perspective broadens our gaze by attending 
to the ways in which IS are enacted and performed simultaneously and inseparably 
socially, discursively and materially, technologically in relations in practice.  We 
acknowledge that being performed and enacted in different practices IS are creating 
multiple realities and there are various possible reasons why an IS enactment creates 
one kind of reality rather than another.   
3  Research Methodology 
ANT embodies several key aspects of sociomateriality relevant to our examination of 
IS success and failure. ANT does not make a priori assumptions about the nature of 
actors or the ways they act to make up their worlds. Any human or non-human actor 
can be involved in relations, form alliances and pursue common interests in an actor-
network.  An IS development and implementation as well as utilization endeavour can 
be seen as emergent, entangled, sociomaterial actor-networks created by aligning 
interests of developers, users, documents, methodology and technologies. The align-
ment of interests within an actor-network is achieved through the enrolment of allies 
and translation of their interests in order to be congruent with those of the network 
(Walsham 1997).  The actors enrolled in a network have “their own strategic prefer-
ences [and] the problem for the enroller therefore is to ensure that participants adhere 
to the enroller’s interests rather than their own” (McLean and Hassard 2004, p. 495). 
Translation can be achieved through scripts, which influence actors to act in a particu-
lar way so as to achieve an actor-network’s goals.   
An actor-network does not imply existence of its constituting actors, but rather sees 
them constituted by the relations they are involved in.  It is the morphology of relations 
which tells us what actors are and what they do (Callon 1999). The network changes 
through enrolment of new actors, creation of new alliances and changing relations 
among its actors.  With an increasing alignment of interests and strengthening of rela-
tions an actor-network becomes more stabilized. This is what actor-networks strive for.  
However, they do not necessarily succeed; they may get weaker, break up and disap-
pear. How they strengthen and stabilize or break up and dissolve is an interesting theo-
retical question with serious practical implications. 
In line with other IS researchers who adopted ANT to provide robust accounts of 
the production and reconfiguration of relations in the development and implementation 
of IS seen as actor-networks (see e.g. Mitev 1996; Vidgen and McMasters 1997; Wal-
sham and Sahay 1999; Holmström and Robey 2005) we develop an ANT account of 
the Olympia-online project. Without many prescriptions in the literature about how to 
do that we focused on practices of IS development and use and adopted the general 
advice ‘follow the actors’. One member of the research team spent 6 months as staff on 
the Olympia-online development team. This was useful for gaining knowledge of the 
company, its management and IS development processes and for subsequent examina-
tion of actors and actor-networks. However the actual ANT study of the project started 
after her contract in the company had been concluded.   
We initially focused on the development team, but then expanded our view as we 
traced enrolments, actors and their associations. The tracing of associations and identi-
fication and exploration of the creation and emergence of actor-networks led us to new 
human and non-human actors in the project team and beyond – to managers and bro-
kers; the e-business platform, the insurance industry, etc.  At some point following the 
actors and tracing further associations had to stop. We had to learn to recognize and 
when and where to ‘cut the network’, in the words of Barad (2003) identifying or mak-
ing agential cuts.  “The trick is”, says Miller (1996, p. 363), “to select the path you 
wish to follow, and those which you wish to ignore, and do so according to the assem-
blage you wish to chart”.  
During our study we encountered 46 human actors, engaged with technologies, im-
portant documents and other non-human actors, at different stages and locations.  We 
had informal conversations with 21 human actors, traced additional 13 that played a 
role in the past but had left, and formally interviewed 12: 2 architects, 2 application 
developers, a data migration developer, a senior business analyst, a business project 
manager, a test team leader, a business expert underwriting, a business expert liaising 
with brokers, a senior IS executive and a senior General Insurance (GI) business man-
ager. Documents that played an important role included a business plan, a business 
case and scope document, business information requirements, change requests, test 
plans, test cases, and project reports; important technology actants included the web-
based e-business platform, a rule-based software engine, mainframe resources, applica-
tion programs, interface designs and programs, and IT architecture.   
The empirical data helped us reveal and reconstruct the trajectories of the actor-
networks.  It often exposed tensions and the political nature of the issues discussed.  In 
the interviews as well as in the informal discussions we let the actors make sense of the 
project, their experiences and various events. Following the actors and their relations 
emerging in the project as well as executing, identifying and analysing agential cuts 
helped us map the creation and reconfiguration of several actor-networks. This was an 
iterative process that involved describing, analysing and revising these actor-networks, 
using ANT inquiry to reveal the inner workings of various actors and their networks 
e.g. enrolling actors into a network and ensuring that members of a network align with 
the enroller’s interests; using delegates such as technology or documents to exert pow-
er and influence others.  In this way we exposed different enactments of Olympia-
online in practice and the ways in which they produced multiple realities including the 
coexisting and controversial assessments of its success and failure. 
4 The Company Olympia and its Olympia-Online Project 
Olympia-online was an industry-first e-business system in the Australian insurance 
market that transacted the company’s insurance products directly to brokers over the 
web. Knowledge about building such systems was scarce in both the insurance and 
the IT industry. The final system was highly innovative in the way it represented the 
company’s insurance products and enabled on-line engagement and interaction with 
brokers, who as intermediaries sell these products to customers. The withdrawal of 
the top management support for further Olympia-online development created a worry-
ing situation for the company.  Olympia-online was vital to the company since all its 
business was mediated through brokers; unlike other insurance companies, it had no 
direct contact with individual customers.  System developers in particular were acute-
ly aware that the lack of top managers’ commitment to continue funding its further 
development would put the company at risk and seriously threaten its future competi-
tiveness.  
 Prior to the development of Olympia-online Olympia was not seen as a major 
competitor in the Australian general insurance market.  All e-business in the Australi-
an Insurance Industry was conducted via ‘BrokerLine’, an outdated mainframe-based 
electronic platform, run by Telcom, an Australian telecommunications company.  
Early in 2001 Telcom announced that they were ceasing operation of BrokerLine and 
that all companies were required to move their business operations to a new web-
based platform ‘Horizon’.  
 Most insurance companies transacted their business both directly with individual 
businesses and via brokers, being reciprocally aligned with both; thus Olympia was 
particularly vulnerable to the platform change. Fearing loss of their business and sim-
ultaneously recognising opportunities of a new web-based platform, Olympia’s GI 
Business Division and the Strategy & Planning Division went about putting together a 
business case for the development of a new web-based IS, Olympia-online. They 
inscribed Olympia’s interest and its new strategy into the Olympia-online Business 
Plan, which became an effective instrument for enrolling the Information Services 
Department (ISD) into the new IS development actor-network. This inscription was 
strong enough to motivate ISD to attempt alignment with Horizon and the brokers. As 
a key actor in the new emerging actor-network ISD was charged with the responsibil-
ity to develop a concrete solution – a new IS that enabled transecting with brokers via 
Horizon’s web-based platform as described in the Business Case documentation. With 
a prospect of becoming the only channel through which Olympia would interact with 
brokers to sell its products, Olympia-online development became a strategic IS pro-
ject in the company. 
Olympia-online was a new type of IS in the insurance industry. Without in-house 
experience or skills and resources, Olympia searched for a supplier with the capabili-
ties to develop Olympia-online thus attempting to enrol an actor to ensure Olympia’s 
alignment with Horizon.  Based on the scripts expressed in the Business Case docu-
mentation, two companies bided for a contract with Olympia thus attempting to forge 
an alignment with the company. This process was mediated through Olympia’s Senior 
ISD Architect.  The company HighTech was successful as it did promise delivery 
within the desired timeframe and a fixed-price contract.  Developers from HighTech 
succeeded in demonstrating that the Emperor, a proprietary rules engine of which 
HighTech was the sole reseller in Australia, was an appropriate technology upon 
which the new system could be built. By successfully aligning themselves with Olym-
pia’s strategy inscribed in the Business Plan, HighTech and Emperor became enrolled 
into the Olympia-online development actor-network. The signed contract marked the 
beginning of Phase 1 of the Olympia-online development. Phase 1 development began 
with initial requirements gathering sessions by the HighTech team. 
4.1 Phase 1 Olympia-online Development 
The Hightech team had to understand the insurance business, the data and rules in 
insurance products, as they had no experience in insurance applications. Once devel-
opment was underway, several problems emerged. It became clear to ISD staff that 
HighTech’s developers had not grasped the breadth and depth of the problem, result-
ing in the project running seven months over schedule. In retrospect, the Senior ISD 
Architect involved in commissioning HighTech noted that the HighTech team “didn’t 
understand the problem at hand” and underestimated its complexity, costs and the 
required development time. During this time, ISD staff realized that Emperor “was 
not the right engine for Olympia-online’s purpose”. When used to model insurance 
products and their complex business rules, Emperor exhibited severe limitations and 
rigidity. As a result the design of the application software was cumbersome and com-
plex, requiring the development of extra software components to compensate for its 
insufficiency. Instead of working with a rule engine that had a “natural fit” with in-
surance products as HighTech developers initially claimed, the ISD team discovered a 
“dramatic misfit”.  Emperor was misaligned with Olympia-online’s objectives.  
In the initial Olympia-online development actor-network there were several at-
tempts of alignment and many translations going on. The HighTech Project Manager 
attempted alignment with the Senior ISD Architect and at the same time exerted pow-
er over the Olympia team’s work by making design decisions regarding the use of 
Emperor in the system’s development based on his architect’s advice.  While he never 
fully disclosed Emperor’s limitations for modelling insurance products, he successful-
ly negotiated and established its key role in Olympia-online.   
As the relations between the software components built on Emperor and those on 
the mainframe grew tighter the implications for the functionality and efficient opera-
tions of Olympia-online became more evident. The relations between the HighTech 
team and the Olympia team, Emperor and the mainframe system were highly conten-
tious, yet critical for the development of Olympia-online.  By insisting on Emperor as 
a platform for the application software the HighTech Project Manager by way of his 
Architect ensured that his company’s interests were inscribed in the software. The 
more this software became dependent on Emperor the more this actor-network be-
came irreversible2. 
During Phase 1 the development actor-network was continually reconfigured 
through a series of translation processes that strengthened some alignments but failed 
others, and thus prevented its stabilization. The two actors overseeing this work, the 
HighTech Project Manager and the Olympia Head Architect, had trouble ensuring the 
delivery of the system with the specified functionality on time.  At the beginning of 
2002, as Phase 1 was significantly delayed, the GI Business Division was anxious to 
announce to the brokers that the new system was ready for use.  They publicly prom-
ised that full functionality would be available by mid 2002 which upset ISD staff. 
When finally delivered to the brokers, despite nine months delay, Olympia-online was 
a great success: brokers were delighted with the new technology. The web-based 
specification of insurance products enabled brokers’ flexible interaction with Olympia 
while selling its products to customers. Able to focus on customer needs and tailor 
products to meet these needs brokers gradually changed their work processes.  Their 
enactment of Olympia-online produced different practices in transacting business with 
Olympia and its customers.   
                                                          
2 Phase 1 was further complicated by yet another translation process going on in the develop-
ment of the interface between Olympia-online and Horizon. This was carried out by another 
third party, that is, another actor-network which we did not dig further into as this was not 
relevant for answering our research.   
 
This first implementation of Olympia-online however exposed numerous technical 
problems, slow performance, frequent crashes and defects.  As a result ISD staff had 
huge difficulties in maintaining it.  Furthermore, its design was not modular and 
hence the system lacked the ability to be scaled to Olympia’s future needs. ISD staff 
and their Senior Architect in particular, believed that Olympia-online’s technical fail-
ures were caused primarily by the use of Emperor that “could not easily model com-
plex insurance products”.  The Emperor’s rule engine, they found out too late, was 
originally developed for specification of physical products such as machinery and had 
never been used before for products as complex as insurance. The enrolment of 
HighTech and Emperor into the Olympia-online development was, in their view, a 
wrong decision. In the meantime, the broker community strengthened their relation 
with Olympia and communicated its satisfaction with the system to the GI Business 
Division. Being first-to-market Olympia-online attracted new brokers and boosted 
business so GI revenue for business insurance grew significantly.  Through their con-
tacts with the HighTech Project Manager GI Business Managers believed that Emper-
or was the key contributor to the success. They were not aware of the problems expe-
rienced in the development nor did they realise the full extent of the system’s tech-
nical failures and instability in operations.  They thought the Olympia-online system 
was an unqualified success. 
Based on this market success, GI Business Managers, in discussions with 
HighTech, made the decision to purchase $1 million worth of Emperor Licenses such 
that the existing system could be extended and more systems and products could be 
developed in the future. This decision was made without consulting ISD staff, as their 
mutual relations had deteriorated by that time. In the meantime, ISD staff were busy 
struggling to maintain an unstable system and respond to numerous defects.  When 
Olympia-online became so unstable that its maintenance and use could no longer be 
sustained, ISD proposed Phase 2 of the Olympia-online development.  Since GI man-
agers had already spent $1 million on licensing it ISD had no other option but to con-
tinue the further development of Olympia-online with Emperor.   
4.2  Phase 2 Olympia-online Development 
Phase 2 started mid 2003 and the system went live in April 2005 with one major goal 
being to bring the Olympia-online development and knowledge in house, since “it 
was the key to Olympia’s overall strategy” to prevent expertise from leaving the com-
pany.  This goal was not easily achievable since Olympia continued to be reliant on 
HighTech as the only resource provider for Emperor in Australia.  The other goal was 
the delivery of the system on time and budget. Consequently Olympia-online was  
now developed under a stringent project governance and management regime. The 
emerging situation resulted in three partially overlapping actor-networks: a Steering 
Committee, a development, and a Brokers actor-network.  
 A Steering Committee consisting of stakeholders from the GI Business Division, 
the Strategy and Planning Division, as well as ISD, was created.  The Steering Com-
mittee was financially responsible for the project and thus primarily concerned with 
timeframes and costs.  According to a team member, Phase 2 “focused disproportion-
ately on short-term issues and cost considerations, at the expense of long-term quality 
and functionality”.  This, in his view, stemmed from the Steering Committee via the 
Business Project Manager and the IS Project Manager, two new roles, who were re-
sponsible for short term goals – the system’s delivery on time and on budget, but 
“seemed not concerned with the system’s objectives in the long term”.   
 The emerging Steering Committee actor-network grew more aligned with the 
commitment to impose tighter control over the Olympia-online project, keen not to 
repeat the mistakes from Phase 1. At the same time its relations with the development 
network deteriorated, leaving few options for interaction.  In the meantime the devel-
opment actor-network continuously reconfigured. Continued problems with Emperor 
and inadequate resources as requests for additional resources were rejected by the 
Steering Committee increased tensions and prevented its stabilization. In Phase 2 
again the Olympia development team had not enough time and resources to design a 
modular architecture based on which all subsystems would be developed including 
future system expansion. The tight budget control and insistence on the planned time-
line by the IS Project Manager increased tensions and did little to resolve the key 
problems in the development of the system.  
A Brokers’ actor-network emerged and grew strong throughout Phase 2.  Major 
efforts and resources were allocated to redesigning Olympia-online to serve brokers 
due to the Business Experts’ continued parallel engagement in the development actor-
network and with the broker community. They successfully translated the project 
objectives to be aligned with their own and the broker community interests.  Their 
involvement and influence ensured that the system was not implemented until a suffi-
cient level of functionality and quality required by brokers had been delivered. While 
this caused tensions with the IS Project Manager “who was constantly pushing for fast 
delivery” the engagement of the Business Experts resulted in the inscription of the 
brokers’ views and the translation of their interests in Olympia-online leading to a 
strong alignment between the system and the broker community and to a network 
stabilization. The quality of the resulting Olympia-online was, as the Business Expert 
liaising brokers confirmed, exceptional. This ensured that Olympia-online continued 
and enhanced its market success.  This was acknowledged by a Senior GI Business 
Manager. However, he also said that the project overran, costed too much, and didn’t 
deliver the expected internal functionality.  
This view prevailed in the Steering Committee actor-network despite attempts of 
alignment by the two Business Experts to convince the Steering Committee about the 
system’s market success. While they were initially enthusiastic about the Olympia-
online development, the GI business managers did not engage with the Phase 2 devel-
opment, as their enrolment in that actor-network became weaker rather than stronger.  
The reports to the Steering Committee by the IS Project Manager, providing the key 
relations with the development network, did not indicate early enough that Phase 2 
would be delayed and over budget,  nor did they indicate that the internal functionali-
ty would not be delivered. The managers’ view was that they had pretty regular re-
quirements for the system’s core internal functionality, management and operational 
reporting, that “any IS would normally deliver”.  Their requests were not translated 
into the system. When the system at the end of Phase 2 did not deliver the requested 
functionality and when it became evident that it was again over time and over budget, 
there was no doubt in the Steering Committee network that the Phase 2 Olympia-
online was an “obvious failure“.  The GI Business Division, ultimately responsible 
for funding, withdrew their support and the Steering Committee did not approve plans 
for building Olympia-online further. This decision might jeopardise Olympia’s mar-
ket position and a loss of competitive advantage.  
 
 
5 How Olympia-online became both a Success and a Failure 
The conflicting assessments of Olympia-online cannot be explained within existing 
perspectives. Taking the rationalist perspective (DeLone and McLean 1992, 2003) 
(see Table 1) one would expect that ‘senior management support’ evident in most part 
of the project is a good predictor of Olympia-online success. However this factor was 
probably more directly linked to system failure: GI managers support led to the deci-
sion to purchase the license that played a major role in the production of system fail-
ure. Another expected success factor, ‘strict management control’, evident in Phase 2, 
can also be associated more with the failure than the success. Circumstances and dy-
namics of organisational processes in any non-trivial IS development are so complex 
that a simple explanation of causally linked factors does not make much sense.  
The process perspective would reveal organizational and socio-technical processes 
that led to successful innovation in selling insurance products and the brokers’ inter-
action with the company, therefore leading to success. It would also reveal many 
technical flaws in designing Olympia-online that led to failure. The perspective how-
ever cannot deal with ambiguous and changing assessments nor with contradicting 
outcomes – Olympia-online is neither abandoned nor supported for future develop-
ment.  While the process perspective does not attempt to provide an objective account 
of IS success and failure it still sees them as discrete and irreversible ‘outcomes’, 
resulting from certain organisational and sociotechnical processes.   
The social constructivist perspective would explain how both the success and fail-
ure of Olympia-online were socially constructed. From this perspective the stories and 
narratives of relevant social groups, GI managers, developers, and brokers, can be 
seen as producing the discourses of failure as well as the discourses of success. The 
Olympia-online system is perceived and interpreted differently by these relevant so-
cial groups, thereby implying its interpretive flexibility.  Pluralist views and different 
Olympia-online assessments thus are perspectival in nature.  The problem with social 
constructivism is that excessive power is attributed to representations and words and 
discourses of IS success and failure without recognising their material foundation.  
5.1 Reconceputalizing the success and failure of IS 
The sociomaterial perspective considers IS success and failure as relational effects, 
that do not exist by themselves but are endlessly generated in actor-networks (Law 
2004). It directs attention to the different practices enacted by Olympia-online devel-
opment and use and to the ways in which such enactments produced multiple realities 
of system success and failure.  The sociomaterial perspective is premised on a con-
ception of technology and IS as non-human actors which are constitutively entangled 
with human actors in webs of relations in situated practices (Orlikowski 2007). In-
stead of investigating how one impacts on the other, we experience these actors’ 
worlds. This enables us to see how IS success and failure are produced by socio-
material dynamics in actor-networks. Actor-networks are not clearly distinguishable 
entities, they are (parts of) sociomaterial entanglements and become visible through 
agential cuts. 
The production of Olympia-online success in the brokers’ actor-network can be 
traced to the Business Experts’ engagement to translate the brokers’ needs and inter-
ests into the development of the Olympia-online software. Their engagement became 
even more prominent in Phase 2 as they forged close interaction and further alignment 
between brokers, the development team, the Olympia-online software and Horizon.  
Emerging through these processes was the brokers’ network which had an evident 
overlap with the development network; they shared actors and relations that assisted 
their mutual alignment. Being heavily engaged in the system testing, the brokers ex-
pressed their high appreciation for the system quality.   The new reality of Olympia-
online enacted in the brokers’ actor-network resulted from transformation of their 
work practices and their innovative ways of customizing products for customers and 
transacting business with Olympia. The wide adoption of these practices created mar-
ket success and tangible benefits for Olympia. The production of success was not only 
the result of the brokers’ attribution of meanings and discursive construction of 
Olympia-online in their practices. It was also material and technological; the devel-
opment actor-network and the overlapping brokers’ actor-network jointly created such 
a sociomaterial constellation that the development of Olympia-online and its enact-
ment in the brokers’ practices became closely connected, mutually triggering changes 
in each other. The brokers were part of and contributors to the sociomaterial constel-
lation as they innovated their practices through the appropriation of Olympia-online 
and based on this experience suggested changes in the system.  
A sociomaterial entanglement is a network arrangement, a mangle of practice, 
which implies inseparability of the social, discursive and the material, technological 
that are “mutually and emergently productive of one another” (Pickering 1993, p. 
567). They are inseparable in the overall reconstruction of organisational reality, but 
become locally separable through agential cuts. It is in fact very difficult, sometimes 
impossible, to separate the social, discursive from the material, technological produc-
tion of the Olympia-online reality in the brokers’ practices. They are intimately fused 
in the brokers’ situated experiences and their enactment of new and innovative prac-
tices in the sociomaterial constellation emerging in the brokers’ actor-network.  The 
sociomaterial constellation that fused together multiple meanings and material tech-
nologies of Olympia-online development, its software proper, and the brokers’ prac-
tices was created simultaneously in both networks. The two networks were porous 
enough to co-create such a sociomaterial constellation that in the brokers’ network 
produced the reality of the Olympia-online success in the market. 
The trajectory and dynamics of the Olympia-online development actor-network 
are even more complicated.  The complexity of this network arose due to enrolment 
of numerous actants, complex translation processes and continuous building and re-
configuring of relations during both phases. The key enrolment in Phase 1 of the de-
velopment network was that of the rule-engine Emperor.  Due to Emperor’s central 
role in modelling insurance products and related business rules the Olympia-online 
software became intimately dependent on it. With the purchase of the Emperor Li-
cense, the actor-network further increased its dependence on Emperor with significant 
ramifications.   
When the Olympia team engaged with Emperor’s rule-based Engine – while de-
signing and testing the software’s structure, processes, user interface, security proce-
dures, etc. – they experienced severe limitations in modelling insurance products. The 
built software built was therefore cumbersome and complex. The sociomaterial con-
stellation that emerged in the relations between the Olympia team, the HighTech 
team, Emperor, the mainframe, and the business experts only allowed for a limited 
and ineffective translation of insurance products and business rules into the Olympia-
online software.  Emperor’s agency in this translation process was not only a social 
construction. It  was relationally and materially enacted through the project manag-
ers’, the architects’ and the developers’ practices within this sociomaterial entangle-
ment  which did not leave them with much design alternatives, allowing only particu-
lar design practices, and leaving traces in the designed structures, application pro-
grams, and processes. This is congruent with Quattrone and Hopper’s (2006) findings 
that agency of technology extends beyond human responses to it and that it resides in 
the chain of relations between the actants.  
While after Phase 1, the general consensus amongst Olympia-online development 
team members was that Emperor should be abandoned this became politically unfea-
sible due to the money spent on Emperor licensing. Furthermore, the more code the 
development team developed based on Emperor the less likely they were to abandon 
it. Dependency on Emperor in the development network became thus more and more 
irreversible making it almost impossible to “go back to a point where alternative pos-
sibilities exist[ed]” (Walsham and Sahay 1999, p. 42).  The increasing irreversibility 
of the development actor-network made its sociomaterial entanglement increasingly 
more critical and consequential for the final system. 
Another important dynamics arose through this network’s relations with the Steer-
ing committee network. During Phase 2 the Olympia team requested further resources 
arguing that the complexity of Olympia-online and the problems with Emperor neces-
sitated much more than initially planned.  However, no additional resources were 
approved by the Steering Committee. The very objective of creating this committee 
and the two new management roles in Phase 2 were to enforce strict budget control 
and the delivery deadline.  This objective was firmly held by the committee and the 
network formed around it. Without additional resources the team was not able to de-
liver full functionality. Seeing the functionality for the brokers as a priority the team, 
to some extent influenced by the Business Experts, allocated all their resources to 
develop this functionality first.  It however meant delaying the development of func-
tionality required by the GI managers.  This was not known outside this network and 
was first reported by the IS Project Manager to the Steering Committee just before the 
end of Phase 2. 
Although the Olympia-online development was not completed and its actor-
network did not stabilize Phase 2 was concluded as the project was already over time 
and budget. At this point in time the developers were fully aware of the technical 
deficiency of the Olympia-online design. Highly limited resources and the complexity 
of the design had prevented a radical change of the architecture in Phase 2. It was a 
series of sociomaterial entanglements that we traced during this network reconfigura-
tion in Phases 1 and 2, which produced the final Olympia-online system.  But this did 
not happen in isolation.  Relations emerging in the other two networks, partially over-
lapping with the development network, played their role as well.   
The Steering Committee actor-network had a direct influence on the IS Project 
Manager and the Business Project Manager that were charged with the responsibility 
to impose stringent project and budget control. This was a major relation between the 
Steering Committee actor-network and the development network. By purchasing the 
Emperor license and thereby effectively enrolling it in the development actor-network 
the Steering Committee showed their commitment and support for the project. How-
ever, the relations between the two networks became weaker. Attempts by the Busi-
ness Experts to strengthen the ties with the Steering Committee and align its net-
work‘s objectives with that of the development network had not been doing well.  In 
Phase 2 the two networks emerged less connected and less aligned than before. The 
market success of Olympia-online was acknowledged by the GI managers but this 
only confirmed their appreciation for Emperor. The sociomaterial entanglement with-
in the Steering Committee actor-network was enacted by the managers’ preoccupation 
with budget control and deadlines, sporadic relations with the HighTech team and 
reports by the IS Project Manager, including the final one informing them that the 
expected functionality requested by GI managers was not going to be delivered, and 
that the development was over time and budget.  There were no relations with the 
development team or the application software. The resulting failure verdict seemed an 
inevitable outcome.  
This analysis suggests the relevance of the emergence and reconfiguration of ac-
tor-networks understood as sociomaterial entanglements for the comprehension of 
different enactments and assessments of IS. The success and the failure of Olympia-
online were more than different perceptions and social constructions by relevant so-
cial groups. Due to the assembling and reconfiguring of the actor-networks multiple 
sociomaterial constellations emerged.  The sociomaterial entanglements involved 
inseparable and mutually constituting discursive and material constructions which we 
turned visible through agential cuts. The analysis shows it is not just humans who 
discursively through the communication of knowledge or the lack hereof or through 
timely or untimely reporting construct the success or failure, nor is it only material 
resources, technology and material components of an IS such as internal and external 
functions, modular structures or platforms that exert influence on human actors thus 
causing the success or failure, it is the emergence of the(ir) sociomaterial relations 
within which they encounter each other and through which the discursive and the 
material technology are entangled and preformed, f. ex. through the purchase of li-
censes or resource constraints, and construct a success or a failure. Agential cuts turn 
these entanglements visible and render them locally separable. The success and fail-
ure of IS are made in and by multiple actor-networks.  
5. 2  Multiple IS realities and IS success and failure 
Olympia-online was continuously re-enacted in practices of different actor-networks, 
which produced multiple, alternative realities. The recognition of multiplicity of IS 
realities in practice is conceptually different from plurality implied by social construc-
tivism (Law 2004; Mol 1999).  Plurality assumes a single reality that is observed, 
perceived and interpreted differently by different social groups, hence plurality of 
views and assessments (Bartis and Mitev 2008; Wilson and Howcroft 2005). Multi-
plicity implies multiple realities that are “done and enacted rather than observed. Ra-
ther than being seen by a diversity of watching eyes while itself remaining untouched 
in the centre, reality is manipulated by means of various tools in the course of a diver-
sity of practices” (Mol  1999, p. 77, emphasis in the original).  Enactments of the 
Olympia-online development and use in different practices within the three different 
actor-networks produced multiple realities. The resulting co-existence of multiple 
Olympia-online realities created a problem Olympia was incapable of resolving: it 
was stuck with contradicting assessments; unable to reconcile this multiplicity. The 
decision regarding investment into Olympia-online’s further development was stalled. 
Beyond the project’s fate Olympia’s relationship with brokers, its market position, 
and ultimately the company’s future are at stake. Such a situation raises the question: 
what could be done?  
As conditions of creation and emergence of actor-networks are not given but cre-
ated and re-created, realities might be done in other ways, that different sociomaterial 
entanglements of an IS development “might make it possible to enact realities in dif-
ferent ways” (Law 2004, p. 66).   Enacting an IS and performing a reality one way or 
another can thus be open for debate. Understanding the Olympia-online case may help 
both practitioners and researchers gain deeper insights into the production of the IS 
realities of success and failure, help undo some deeds, and perhaps prevent failure.  
The trajectories of the actor-networks in Phase 1 and 2 reveal the conditions for pos-
sible options at any point in time, with some actions and reconfigurations playing a 
more significant role than others.  
The reality of Olympia-online’s success in the market was produced by the bro-
kers’ network; key were the actions of the Business Experts who actively engaged in 
translating the brokers’ needs into the IS and attracted brokers to engage in testing 
and who contributed to the resource allocation for testing Olympia-online’s usability. 
This strengthened the relations between development and brokers networks thus pro-
ducing success. However it hid the resource allocation to meet the brokers’ needs.  
While it ensured high quality functionality for the brokers it withdrew resources from 
development of internal functionality relevant for the GI managers.  On reflection, 
this could have been different, choosing perhaps a more balanced resource allocation. 
The reality of Olympia-online enacted by the Steering Committee actor-network 
resulted in the assessment of failure. Neither the GI Managers nor other members of 
the committee ever questioned or revised the initial prediction of the project resources 
and duration for Phase 2 despite new evidence about the increasing complexity of the 
project and a need for larger resources to complete the project – contained in reports 
submitted to the Steering Committee. During Phase 2 the committee actor-network 
became more stabilized and at the same time more disconnected from the develop-
ment actor-network. Consequently this network was narrowed and steadfast, leaving 
no options for alternative considerations. Despite the evidence of market success, 
Olympia-online for them was a failure. The failure verdict was natural and obvious:  it 
was seen as “based on hard facts” as “the system was over time and over budget” and 
“its internal functionality was not delivered”. However the use of these particular 
measures of project success/failure was never explicated. Options to discuss different 
assessment criteria and to question and revise initial estimates of required resources 
and time were not considered. A possibility of questioning assumptions regarding a 
stable and robust infrastructure had not been entertained. This might have led to op-
portunities for enactment of a different reality and for taking different action regard-
ing Olympia-online’s future development.    
Finally, for the development actor-network the HighTech enrollment was highly 
consequential with Emperor playing a key role in the Olympia-online development.  It 
was plagued by the developers’ battle with Emperor and its integration with the main-
frame. It engaged unexpectedly large resources thus contributing to prolonged deliv-
ery and missing functionality of the final system. Choosing an option to reject work-
ing with Emperor, even after the license was purchased, would have changed the net-
work’s trajectory; other options included contract termination with HighTech and the 
enrollment of other partner companies, fulfillment of the initial objectives to develop 
a modular architecture, and a more balanced resource allocation to deliver full system 
functionality.  
The discussion reveals multiple and largely incoherent realities within the identi-
fied actor-networks. It reveals some possibilities and options to make different choic-
es at particular points in time and enact realities in different ways. Some of these op-
tions still existed but were not seen by the actors when the decisions concerning 
Olympia-online’s future were made. To see them actors needed to reflect on and un-
derstand the ways in which multiple Olympia-online realities were enacted in differ-
ent practices. The more all stakeholder succeed in understanding the making of these 
multiple realities the more open they might become for re-negotiation and re-
conciliation of multiple assessments in the light of strategic objectives and market 
implications.   
 
6  CONCLUSION 
This essay proposes a sociomaterial perspective on IS success and failure. The inves-
tigation of the Olympia-online case, resulting in concurrently contradicting and un-
reconciled assessments, provided an opportunity to demonstrate a distinct theoretical 
and practical contribution of the sociomaterial perspective to the understanding of IS 
success and failure.  
The sociomaterial perspective focuses on IS enactments in practices that are not 
only performed discursively but also and inevitably materially through sociomaterial 
relations involving material encounters which would be only partially understood by 
social constructivism.  The sociomaterial perspective reveals how the success and the 
failure of IS are produced as relational effects in and by actor-networks. It draws at-
tention to the contingently enacted realities of IS within emergent actor-networks of 
IS development and use in practice.  Through the analysis of reconfigurations of the 
actor-network, we illustrate how multiple realities of system success and failure have 
been produced concurrently. The lessons from the case teach us that there are options 
to make different choices along the way and to re-enact realities differently (Law 
2004).  
In addition, we examined how the networks could have been reconfigured differ-
ently.  An actor-network “is not a network of connecting entities which are already 
there but a network which configures ontologies.” (Callon 1999, pp.185). What an 
enrolment would do or change in an actor-network, is rarely known or well under-
stood when it happens. This suggests further research. There are many open ques-
tions: How can multiple and contradicting realities be reconciled and and thus failure 
be prevented?  How can premature stabilization of an actor-network be avoided and 
how can greater congruence between relevant actor-networks be enabled?  How can 
alternative options for enacting IS reality differently be identified?  
Finally, conducting and presenting an ANT study poses many challenges.  Follow-
ing the actors and investigating the relations within actor-networks by making agen-
tial cuts reveal complexities that resist clear and simplified presentations and a linear 
story typically expected of academic writing.  An ANT study emphasises flow and 
change as key to understanding the being and doing of actors as well as the emer-
gence and reconfiguration of actor-networks. As this is not easily communicated we 
produced snapshots and momentary outside views of actors’ worlds at different points 
in the project timeline.  These are inherently limited by the nature of the printed me-
dium and a potential domain of future research might explore alternatives genres and 
new electronic media in presenting actor-networks and achieved research results. 
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